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Is Race to the bottom is modeled as Prisoner's dilemma? 
Abstract 
The subject of this study is the modeling of Race to the bottom to verify, is 
really Race to the bottom is a kind of Prisoner’s dilemma. 
The importance of this issue is explained by the following: if Race to the 
bottom is a kind of Prisoner’s dilemma, achieving equilibrium tax competition two or 
more economies leads to deterioration of their economic results As a result, 
governments have to weaken social, environmental, labor standards and norms. 
At the same time, many statistical studies of real economies do not discover the 
above consequence of the tax competition, so it is concluded that there is no Race to 
the bottom. 
On the other hand, if Race to the bottom is not a kind of PD then that there is 
no deterioration in standards during the tax competition does not mean that there is 
no Race to the bottom. 
Using a game-theoretic model we consider 3 objective functions for 
government behavior: the investment volume, the budget revenue, and their 
combination. For each function, there were calculated conditions under which Race 
to the bottom is a kind of Prisoner’s dilemma. 
Introduced a concept of tax-investment equilibrium, as a situation in which all 
economies are equal for the investor. For the tax-investment equilibrium, there were 
calculated sufficient conditions under which Race to the bottom is a kind of 
Prisoner’s dilemma. 
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 Introduction 
Since the first articulation of the problem Race to the bottom (what is credited 
to Louis Brandeis), this issue has received much attention. 
Since taxes, as the main budgetary source, affect many spheres of government 
activity, the topic of competition for investment by decreasing the tax burden 
attracts the attention not only of economists and managers but also of lawyers, 
political and social scientists, etc. (Tiebout, 1956, Cary, 1974, Murphy, 2004, 
Lindblom, 1977, Bates, 1985, Przeworski, 1988, Wallerstein, 1995, Blinder, 2006, 
Levy, 2005, Cohen, 2005, Freeman, 2005). Herewith the areas (the subjects) of 
research are global capital markets, in particular, offshore activities, global policy 
and regional government, environmental and social standards. 
The main issues of this problem that are currently being discussed are: 
1) is really there a trend in the global economy to decrease the corporate tax burden? 
2) does such a decrease lead to lower social (and environmental) standards due to a 
lack of budget revenues? 
3) do governments apply compensatory mechanisms by raising other taxes? 
1) The trend to decrease the tax burden on corporations in the global economy 
definitely is. 
The analysis of CIT rate for 171 countries for which statistics are available 
from 2002 till 2018 (Corporate tax rates table, 2019) shows as for this time horizon 
the average CIT rate reduced by 5,63%: from 29,42% to 23,79% (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. CIT change in world countries from 2005 until 2017 years 
 
Source: (Corporate tax rates table, 2019) 
2) The rest of the issues got an active discussion and a wide range of opinions 
in the scientific world. 
The hypothesis, that Race to the bottom almost inevitably leads to a 
deterioration of social, environmental, etc standards and norms, gained considerable 
popularity (see i.e. Polanyi (1944), pp. 57, 73, Schlesinger (1997), Kuttner (1997), 
Tonelson (2000), p. 15, Greider (2001)). 
Within the identification of the concept Race to the bottom, many researchers 
make general assumptions about government economic behavior that summarized 
e.g. in (Kahler, 1998), namely, they assume that: 
 corporations always prefer lower regulatory standards; 
 the government regulation influences investors' choice of production location; 
 the government responds only (or, at least, generally) to the mobile capital 
advantage factor. 
It concludes that such a situation leads to: 
 a negative correlation between the inflow of investment and the strictness of the 
regulatory standards of the country, because capital is looking for more profitable 
investment, and stricter norms and standards increase production costs, thus 
reducing the profit margin; 
 if one government lowers its regulatory standards to attract more investment, other 
open economies do the same. In addition, it's assumed that states have no choice 
but to lower their standards in order not to face the risk of capital flight. 
However numerous statistical measurements of such a paradigm show in some 
degree controversial results. 
Kiefer and Rada (2013a, 2013b) verify based on statistics for 40 years, whether 
the trend of tax rates decreasing for (1) 13 EU countries; 2) OECD countries) is 
caused by Race to the bottom. 
Based on a study of 1980s statistics by individual EU countries (Union 
Kingdom, France, Germaine, Italy) Mendoza and Tesar quantify macroeconomic 
effects of capital income tax competition (Mendoza, Tesar, 2003a), and calculate 
mutual influence between external factors and quantitative results of tax competition 
(Mendoza, Tesar, 2003b). 
Trandafir, Brezeanu and Stanciu investigate how Race to the bottom affects the 
welfare services condition in Romania (Trandafir, Brezeanu, Stanciu, 2011). 
The research subject by Wheeler (Wheeler, 2001) is to test a statement that 
Race to the bottom leads to a decrease in social and environmental standards and 
norms, lastly, to environmental conditions and living standards. The statistical basis 
for this test is the statistics of 50 developing countries, and 5 ASEAN countries for 
1997-2006 and 1996-2012 yrs. 
Abbas and Klemm (2013), and Revilla (2016) analyze the effect of the 
corporate income tax change on domestic and foreign investment. 
There are a number of areas in which the hypothesis is confirmed but the main 
of the empirical work focuses on labor and environmental regulations. On a political 
level are promoted an argue that globalization causes the decrease down wage burden 
and raises labor and environmental standards (see for example Kapstein (1996), 
Newland (1999)). However, there are no convincing evidences that these predicates 
are true. 
As empirical proofs to support the hypothesis Race to the bottom is given 
examples, that corporations move production to countries because of cheap labor and, 
implicitly, poor labor standards (see for example International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (2000)). However, these observations are different from other cases 
where such standards do not affect the choice of local investment (Spar, 1998). 
Multivariate tests do not show a correlation between FDI and labor standards (Jensen, 
2006). 
Numerous researches, that have tested the impact of environmental standards 
on export indexes in the economy for the 1970s and 1980s, did not show any 
significant correlation (Dean, 1992). The use of recent data establishes that 
environmental regulations have a statistically significant effect on the structure of 
exports of OECD countries in only one study (Beers, 1999). However, there are 
reasons not to consider this result too reliable (Harris, 2002). Intra-industry analyzes 
that allow more exactly to verify industries that are heavily pollutants also do not 
support the hypothesis Race to the bottom (Tobey, 1990, Ratnayake, 1998). 
The trend to Race to the bottom is confirmed for new members, for old 
members there is no statistical confirmation (Dvořáková, 2013). Kiefer, Rada (2013a, 
2013b) assume that the downward trend in tax rates is caused by Race to the bottom. 
(Trandafir, Brezeanu, Stanciu, 2011) accent that very few scientists have discovered 
that Race to the bottom leads to a different structure of public service delivery. Rota-
Graziosi (2019) presents conditions on the marginal productivity of tax-competing 
economies which bind the functions of the demand for the capital of these economies 
and are sufficient to predict Race to the bottom. Wheeler (2001) concludes with the 
fallacy of the hypothesis that Race to the bottom leads to a decrease in social and 
environmental standards and norms, lastly to a decrease in environmental and living 
standards. Abbas and Klemm (2013) і Revilla (2016) note a negative correlation 
between tax burden and investment. Herewith, Abbas and Klemm (2013) point out 
that higher rates increase the economy's revenue in the short term. 
3) The observer by Mendoza and Tesar (2003) shows that during tax 
competition countries offset the negative consequences of CTR revenue reductions 
by regulating other taxes, such as taxes on labor, consumption, etc. 
Empirical analysis and modeling based on it by Rota-Graziosi (2019) show 
if countries compete for capital taxes by regulating labor taxes to maintain 
fiscal solvency, there is no Race to the bottom, and Nash-equilibrium is close to the 
observed taxes; 
instead, if consumption taxes are adjusted to support fiscal solvency, 
competition for capital taxes is leads to Race to the bottom. 
As a result, the main observations of Race to the bottom are as follows: 
 not all countries can statistically confirm Race to the bottom; 
 classically accepted effects are observed on Race to the bottom not very clear and 
far from always; 
 there are cases of balancing CTR by other taxes. 
The first two points are based on the main criticism of the concept of Race to 
the bottom, which mainly concerns the anticipated consequences: deterioration of 
conditions, standards, etc. 
It has caused a row of studies designed to find out based issues of Race to the 
bottom, namely, 
 is there any Race to the bottom at all? 
 what factors and actions weaken its impact? 
There arises a situation that looks as paradoxical: there is a downward trend in 
tax rates but, at the same time, there are no convincing proofs of a deterioration in 
social standards. 
It causes such questions: 
 is such decreasing tax rates can it consider Race to the bottom? 
 is it necessarily to balance decreasing CTR by increasing other tax rates, i.e., 
whether a decrease in CTR necessarily results in budget losses? 
As for the first question, by definition, Race to the bottom is 
the competition with a decrease of the tax rate, 
which by itself does not demand any deterioration (or reduction). The latter is a 
possible consequence of Race to the bottom but is not its essence or property. 
Naturally to assume that the conclusion about the unconditional deterioration 
of standards because of tax rate decrease is largely due to the thesis that Race to the 
bottom is a form of Prisoner’s dilemma (Revesz, 1997, supra note 1, at 1217-1218). 
Really, the essence of Prisoner’s dilemma is players choose Nach-equilibrium, at 
which they get smaller payoffs for other factors being equal. Clearly, in a real 
situation, governments must somehow compensate for this lack of revenue, and thus 
or reduce their other costs to compensate for decreasing tax rate, or, by keeping tax 
rate, relax the requirements for potential investors. 
Thus this research main task is to verify is really Race to the bottom a form of 
Prisoner’s dilemma. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis of unaccountability in the model of certain 
parameters leads to increasing the number of factors and a complication of the model. 
Therefore, there is a desire to analyze Race to the bottom with minimal tools – only 
with CTR – and to show that all the above phenomena are possible even in such a 
case. 
So there is the task to investigate the tax mutual behavior of countries and their 
consequences without compensatory mechanisms by other taxes. 
Methodology 
For researching of the problem Race to the bottom authors generally apply two 
based groups of methods: statistical methods (statistical methods (Kiefer, Rada, 
2013a; 2013b) and regression modeling (Trandafir, Brezeanu, Stanciu, 2011), panel 
researches (Wheeler, 2001) what helps study actual statistics; also models of game 
theory, that allows us to simulate the economic behavior and economies’ interaction, 
and determine the formal relationship between the parameters of interaction. 
In particular Mendoza, Tesar (2003a) use a neoclassical dynamic general 
equilibrium model for 2 players, which contains 3 key externalities of tax 
competition: the relative price externality, the wealth distribution externality, and the 
fiscal solvency externality. In another, their work (Mendoza, Tesar, 2003b) these 
authors are modeling a tax competition as a one-shot game over time-invariant capital 
taxes with dynamic payoffs, which they use to analyze the competition between the 2 
economies by regulating capital, labor and consumption taxes. In addition, changes in 
tax policies of the studied countries are consistent with the quantitative predictions of 
a neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium model of tax competition that contains 
the above basic factors of international tax policy (Mendoza, Tesar, 2005). 
Lastly in the article (Mendoza, Tesar, 2014), they offer the model develop for 2 
economies considering the observed elasticity of the capital tax base and using 
endogenous capacity and a partial depreciation rate. 
The same, game-theory method for research the issue is applied by Rota-
Graziosi (2019). In this case, it’s supermodular games that counts r-concavity of the 
demand for capital, uses production functions in particular quadratic function and 
Cobb-Douglas function. 
In summary, research methods of Race to the bottom can divide into 2 groups: 
statistical methods – to analyze the actual data of economic activity of countries; 
game methods – to model the behavior of governments and economies. 
Since the above main research task is to answer the question is really Race to 
the bottom a form of Prisoner’s dilemma, and Prisoner’s dilemma is modeled by 
game theory, here we use also game theory. 
Modeling 
The purpose of tax competition is to attract investment as a result of more 
favorable conditions for investors. On the other hand, the state attracts investments to 
increase its own welfare i.e., simplistically, its own revenues in other words budget 
revenues. 
So, the objective function of government regulation in the case of tax 
competition can be to maximize either the volume of investment involved in the 
economy or budget revenue from investors’ activity or the sum of the above values. 
Clearly, taxes are directly related to budget revenues, so we have such potential 
quantitative estimates for government behavior (strategies value), as the volume of 
investments, budget revenues, or certain integral quantity that combines the two 
above variables. 
The general matrix of the interaction of 2 countries in the case of Race to the 
bottom is as follows (table 1): 
Table 1. The general form of interaction of 2 countries in the case of Race 
to the bottom 
Country 2 
Country 1 
discount tax rate (τ2–Δτ2) normal tax rate (τ2) 
discount tax rate (τ1–Δτ1)  1 200 00;p p   1 211 11;p p  
normal tax rate (τ1)  1 201 01;p p   1 211 11;p p  
In order for the above game to represent Prisoner’s dilemma it’s necessary that 
 the above game is symmetric, i.e. the conditions: 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
00 00 00 11 11 00 01 10 01 10 01 10; ; ;p p p p p p p p p p p p         are fulfilled; 
 Nash equilibrium of the game is achieved for a mutual strategy  00 00;p p  that 
means that inequalities: 01 00 11 10p p p p    hold true. 
Above there are given the strict conditions of Prisoner’s dilemma. In the 
general case, it’s possible not to fulfill the symmetry condition, but then it’s 
necessary to fulfill not one and two groups of inequalities – on personal for each 
player: 
1 1 1 1
01 00 11 10p p p p   ;     (1.1) 
2 2 2 2
10 00 11 01p p p p   .     (1.2) 
Let 
 the investment volume in each of two economies in the normal tax burden τ1 and 
τ2 is x1 and x2; 
 the attraction of additional investment because of a decrease tax burden by values 
Δτ1 and Δτ2 is respectively 1 201 01,x x  , 1 210 10,x x   and 1 211 11,x x   – for different 
cases of taxation policy of countries. 
Let the analyze system of economies is closed, i.e. the investment is not 
attracted from outside and not bring out of economies. Then investment inflow in one 
economy is accompanied by equivalent investment outflow in the other one. It means 
that 1 201 01 01x x x     , 1 210 10 10x x x     , 1 211 11 11x x x     . At that, the 
above values additional attraction of investment Δx01, Δx10, and Δx11 depend not only 
on Δτ1 and Δτ2, also on τ1, x1, τ2, x2, i.e. on all parameters of the current situation. 
Lower we will use the somewhat idealistic assumption that the economies 
constantly stand in tax-investment equilibrium (indifference), specifically if the 
equilibrium is disturbed as a result of changes in the tax burden it is restored instantly 
by transferring investments from one economy to another. Let's describe the essence 
of tax-investment equilibrium (indifference) for the investors regarding of 
attractiveness of some economy and formal consequences regarding interrelationship 
investment values in different countries. 
Tax-investment equilibrium for n economies 
Let the profitability before taxation ordinary investor in economy i is described 
by the exponential function on investment value in it (saturation of economy): 
  i ixi i ip x a e  ,      (2.1) 
where xi – a part of the total volume of investments in economy i, i.e., 
1
: 1 : 0 1; 1
N
i i
i
i i N x x

      ;   (2.2) 
ai, i – the parameters of the investment climate in economy i, 
: 1 : 0, 0i ii i N a      ; 
N – the number of interacting economies. 
The declining dependence of profitability on investment value can be explained 
that investment increase in economy saturates it and, in accordance, decrease 
normalized profitability1. 
Tax-investment equilibrium (indifference state) arises is supposed to if for the 
investors all N economies are equal, i.e. the revenues after taxation in each of them 
are equal for relative alike investors, so the investments not flow from one economy 
in another. I.e. 
   , : 1 , : 1 1i i j ji j i j N p p       ; 
   , : 1 , : 1 1 xj ji ixi i j ji j i j N a e a e         , (2.3) 
τi – tax rate on income in economy i, : 1 : 0 1ii i N      . 
So here it’s 
1
, : 1 , :
1
i i j jx xji
j i
a
i j i j N e
a
 

    ,   (2.4) 
In the cause of equilibrium (indifference state), the relation 1
1
i
j



  depends not 
on absolute values, and on the relations i
j
a
a
 and 
i i
j j
x
x
e
e

 . 
                                           
1
 The dependence of productivity of an economy on investment value in it is not necessarily 
exponential, there are possible other options: sigmoid function (S-curve, e.g., Gompertz curve), 
power function etc. 
Results 
Case 1. Resulting factor “volume of attracting investment” 
According to the model Race to the bottom if one economy decreases the tax 
burden as the other keeps it at the same level; it leads to additional investment in the 
first economy. It means that for case 1 occurs 1 100 01p p , 1 110 11p p , 2 200 10p p , 
2 2
01 11p p , i.e. Nash equilibrium is really achieved if to use the mutual strategy 
 1 1 2 2;        at a price  1 200 00;p p . However, in the general case there is no 
reason to consider that 1 100 11p p  and/or 2 200 11p p , i.e., the mutual strategy  1 2;   
is more Pareto-efficient than mutual strategy  1 1 2 2;       . 
The matrix of the interaction of 2 economies in the course of Race to the 
bottom, if the resulting factor is the volume of attracted investment is as follows 
(Table 2): 
Table 2. The matrix of the interaction of 2 economies in Race to the 
bottom for the resulting factor “the volume of investment” 
Country 2 
Country 1 
discount tax rate (τ2–Δτ2) normal tax rate (τ2) 
discount tax rate (τ1–Δτ1)  1 11 2 11;x x x x      1 10 2 10;x x x x     
normal tax rate (τ1)  1 01 2 01;x x x x      1 2;x x  
Considering (1.1) Prisoner’s dilemma conditions are in this case such: 
1 01 1 11 1 1 10x x x x x x x         ;   (1.3) 
2 10 2 11 2 2 01x x x x x x x         .   (1.4) 
It’s seen that the conditions (1.3) and (1.4) contradict each other. Really 
11 0x   makes possible the fulfillment (1.4), in return one of conjunct (1.3) is not 
hold, namely 1 11 1x x x   . On the other hand, the negativeness of 11x  opposite 
makes possible the fulfillment of the condition (1.3), in return does not hold (1.4) 
because of 2 11 2x x x   . So if resulting factor of interaction is investment volume, 
Prisoner’s dilemma not arises. 
Case 2. Resulting factor “volume of budgetary receipts” 
The matrix of the interaction of 2 economies in the course of Race to the 
bottom, if the resulting factor is the volume of budget revenues is as follows (Table 
3): 
Table 3. The matrix of the interaction of 2 economies in Race to the 
bottom for resulting factor “the volume of budget revenues” 
Country 2 
Country 1 
discount tax rate (τ2–Δτ2) normal tax rate (τ2) 
discount tax rate (τ1–Δτ1)     
1 1 1 11
2 2 2 11
;x x
x x
 
 
           
 
  
 
1 1 1 10
2 2 10
;x x
x x
 

         
 
normal tax rate (τ1)    
1 1 01
2 2 2 01
;x x
x x

 
         
  1 1 2 2;x x   
Considering (1.1) the conditions of presence of Prisoner’s dilemma are in this 
case such: 
       1 1 01 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 10x x x x x x x                  ;  (1.7) 
       2 2 10 2 2 2 11 2 2 2 2 2 01x x x x x x x                  . (1.8) 
After the transformation (see Appendix A) we get: 
1 011 1 1
10 11 01 1 11
max ; 1x xx x
x x x x


            
;   (1.9) 
10 22 2 2
01 2 10 11 11
1 min ;x xx x
x x x x


            
.   (1.10) 
Case 3. Resulting factor “the volume of budgetary receipts with regard 
given of attraction of additional investment” 
In this case, it can already not unequivocally assert that if one economy 
decreases the tax burden as another keeps it at the same level, it leads to a reduction 
in first-country budget revenue. There are two opposite directional vectors caused by 
the tax rate decrease: a decrease in fees from current investments and an increase in 
the total amount of investments due to attracting new ones. Race to the bottom is 
possible if the amount of tax collected on additional investments in both countries do 
not compensate the losses from existing ones, but it demands additionally to fulfill 
conditions 
1 1
00 11p p  and 2 200 11p p . 
Clearly, if the resulting factor is the total sum of attracted investments and 
budgetary receipts then the general matrix of the interaction of 2 economies in Race 
to the bottom unites naturally two previous cases and is as follows (Table 4): 
Table 4. The matrix of the interaction of 2 economies in Race to the 
bottom for resulting factor “the total sum of attracted investments and 
budgetary receipts” 
Country 2 
Country 1 
discount tax rate (τ2–Δτ2) normal tax rate (τ2) 
discount tax rate 
(τ1–Δτ1) 
  
  
1 1 1 11
2 2 2 11
1 ;
1
x x
x x
 
 
             
 
  
  
1 1 1 10
2 2 10
1 ;
1
x x
x x
 

           
 
normal tax rate (τ1)     
1 1 01
2 2 2 01
1 ;
1
x x
x x

 
           
     1 1 2 21 ; 1x x    
Considering (1.1) the conditions of presence of Prisoner’s dilemma are in this 
case such: 
          1 1 01 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 101 1 1 1x x x x x x x                      ; (1.11) 
          2 2 10 2 2 2 11 2 2 2 2 2 011 1 1 1x x x x x x x                      , (1.12) 
or after the transformation (see Appendix A): 
1 011 1 1
10 11 01 1 11
1
max ; 1x xx x
x x x x


            
;   (1.13) 
10 22 2 2
01 2 10 11 11
11 min ;x xx x
x x x x


            
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Case of 2 economies 
If n=2, (2.3) and (2.4) can be simplified: 
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on this basis 
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The expression (2.6) characterize dependence investment parts in each 
economy on relation tax burdens (specifically, their complements). 
Also from (2.5) it’s can deduce the dependence τ2 on τ1 and x: 
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The investors’ revenues in 1st and 2nd economies, if equilibrium, are equal in 
accordance: 
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and 
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Let: 
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Then (2.8) and (2.9) turn into: 
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The revenues of 1st and 2nd economies, if equilibrium, are equal in 
accordance: 
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From (2.6) it follows that constraint 0 1x   is equivalent to constraint: 
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If the equilibrium is formed for the tax rates τ1, τ2, then in order to maintain the 
equilibrium the quantities of their decreasing Δτ1, Δτ2 are calculated as follows: 
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i.e. the equilibrium is maintained if the ratio of the reduction of rates is equal to the 
ratio of the profits of the parts remaining to investors. 
Prisoner’s dilemma conditions at tax-investment equilibrium 
So, when the system of 2 economies at tax burden, respectively,  1 2;   (one 
of pure game strategy) is in the tax-invest equilibrium, the symmetrical to it pure 
strategy  1 1 2 2;        naturally is also a tax-invest equilibrium, at which is 
no investment movement, i.e. to consider parameters of tax burden decreasing Δτ1 
and Δτ2 those that don't upset the equilibrium (2.19). In other words, the relation of 
the revenue parts at the disposal of investors after-tax must not change. From (2.19) 
can deduce the dependence of Δτ2 on Δτ1, τ1 and τ2: 
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The other two symmetrical one-to-one strategies are convenient to consider 
such situations when one government decreases tax burden and another keeps it at the 
previous level. In this case, there is a flow of investments from the economy with a 
fixed tax burden to the one where the burden has been decreased – to the extent 
necessary to restore the tax-investment equilibrium. Clearly, without loss of 
generality, such a situation is also the case when the second economy decreases the 
tax rate but less than it’s necessary to restore a tax-invest equilibrium. 
The main importance of the tax-invest equilibrium is that in this situation both 
in case 2 and in case 3 1 100 11p p  and 2 200 11p p , as the volume of investment in each 
country remains fixed, and tax burden and as result budget revenues decrease. As a 
consequence the implementation of inequalities 1 101 00p p , 1 111 10p p , 2 210 00p p  and 
2 2
11 01p p  is a sufficient condition for Prisoner’s dilemma. Formally, in the case of a 
tax-invest equilibrium, the expressions in Tables 2-4 and formulas (1.3)-(1.14) are 
simplified. In particular 11 0x  , 01 0x  , 10 0x  . From what it follows that in 
cases 2 & 3 (Tables 3 and 4) the middle inequality is fulfilled always that creates 
necessary preconditions for Prisoner’s dilemma. 
Consider what the values and the ratio of the parameters create sufficient 
conditions for Prisoner’s dilemma. Clearly for this, it’s necessary to fulfill 4 
inequalities in each case. 
Case 2 
(1.9) and (1.10) turn to 
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Based on (2.6) can be written for exponential function: 
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Then (3.2) can be written as 
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and (3.3), counting (3.1), as 
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Case 3 
It’s easily seen that in this case τ1 and τ2 are replaced by τ1+1 and τ2+1. 
Similarly (3.2), (3.3) should be replaced by 
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and (3.4), (3.5) – for exponential function – by 
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Conclusions 
1. As strictly scientific well as more popular economic thought connect the fact 
of Race to the bottom Race to the bottom with the unconditional deterioration of 
economic, social, environmental, etc. standards. This conclusion is largely caused by 
the thesis that Race to the bottom is a form of Prisoner’s dilemma. 
On the other hand, the conclusion that Race to the bottom is equal to Prisoner’s 
dilemma not always, so the tax-competition equilibrium can be to achieve in Pareto 
optimal point, casts doubt on the obligation of governments to compensate for 
revenue shortfalls by reducing costs or weakening standards. 
Firstly, it lets separate the issues of Race to the bottom and compensation 
mechanisms; 
secondly, it removes the controversy many authors write about when in conditions of 
tax competition, there is no reduction in standards. 
Acceptance of this thesis lets analyzes Race to the bottom with minimal tools, 
highlighting the quintessence of economic interaction between economies. 
2. Since taxes are directly related to budget revenues, we have such potential 
objective functions for government behavior, as investment volume, budget revenues, 
or their combination. 
3. An analysis of the above 3 objective functions shows the strategy of Race to 
the bottom does not always lead to Prisoner’s dilemma. If the objective function for 
government behavior is “the volume of investment”, there is no Prisoner dilemma at 
all. 
If the objective function is “budget revenue” or the sum of the volume of 
investment and budget revenue, we can get Prisoner’s dilemma, but with certain 
values of economic interaction parameters. 
4. Introduced a concept of tax-investment equilibrium, namely, as a state in 
which all economies are equal for the potential investor in terms of productivity of 
investments and therefore no investment movement takes place between these 
economies. 
For the tax-investment equilibrium, there were calculated sufficient conditions 
under which Race to the bottom is a kind of Prisoner’s dilemma. 
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 Appendix A 
Algebraic transformations 
Case 2. Resulting factor “value of budgetary receipts” 
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Case 3. Resulting factor “value of budgetary receipts with regard given the 
dynamics of attraction of additional investment” 
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The investors’ revenue for the tax-investment equilibrium 
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 
 
 
 
1
1 1
1 2
1 2 2 2
1 1 1
2
2 2 1 2
1 1 1
11 ln ln
11 1
1 1 2
1 2 2 2
1ln
11 1 1
1 2
1 2 2 2
1 1
1 2
1 2 2
1
111 ln ln
1
11 ln ln
1
1 ln l
x
a
a
a
a
r a e x
a
a e
a
a a
e
a
a a
a

   
    

   
   
  

      
               
  
        
        
   
1
1 221 1 1
2 2 2
1 1
n ;
1 1
a
e
a

  
 
         
 
 
1
1 22
1 1
2
1 2 2
1 1
1 2
1 1
2 2
1ln ln
11
1
1
a
a a
r
a
e
a

 
    


        
. 
The investors’ revenue in the 2nd economy: 
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